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Economistshave long been interested in explaining the level of
housing expenditures by households and have carried out extensive
statistical investigations using a variety of data sources. These studies,
based on the traditional theory which views housing as a homogeneous
good, usually have had the estimation of demand functions for "housing
services" as their principal objective, The variables most often used in
these studies to explain housing expenditures are income and price,
reflecting economists' traditional concern with these economic varia-
bles.
There have been a few studies of the determinants of housing
expenditures based on time-series data. However, most studies have
relied on cross-section data, and because there is little or no observed
variation in net housing prices in cross-section samples, few investiga-
tors have succeeded in obtaining estimates of price elasticities.' As a
result, these studies have been. concerned almost exclusively with esti-
mating the income elasticity of demand for housing services. These
attempts have been the source of no little controversy. The primary
disagreement has centered on whether the demand for housing services
is income elastic, i.e., whether the elasticity of housing expenditures
with respect to income is greater or less than one.
1The most prominent time-series studies are: Richard F. Muth, "The Demand for
Non-Farm Housing" in TheDemand for Durable Goods, ArnoldC. Harberger, ed.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 29—96; Tong Hun Lee, "The Stock
Demand Elasticities of Non-Farm Housing," Review of Economics and Statistics 46, no. I
(Feb. 1964): 82—89; idem, "More on the Stock Demand Elasticities of Non-IFarm Hous-
ing," Review of Economics and Statistics 49, no. 4 (Nov. 1967).
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Margaret Reid and Richard Muth, two of the principal protagonists
in this debate, have presented evidence that the income elasticity is
greater than one, indeed perhaps as large as two.2 They contend that the
lower estimates obtained by other researchers are attributable to an
incorrect measurement of income. Housing decisions, the argument
goes, are long-term decisions and depend more on permanent than on
annual income. Studies relying on annual income will always obtain
biased estimates of the income elasticity with respect to permanent
income, which is the correct measure of income to use in studying the
demand for housing services.
Reid and Muth used several samples of aggregate data for metropol-
itan areas, communities, and census tracts to obtain estimates of the
elasticity of housing expenditure with respect to permanent income.
argument is that the use of aggregate data averages the transitory
components of income, thereby, providing something approximating
permanent income. It seems possible, however, that the aggregation
procedures used by Reid and Muth to obtain estimates of permanent
income have created other problems of specificatiOn and bias.
The analysis of housing expenditures is further complicated by the
fact that households may consume housing services either by renting or
by purchasing. The fOrmer method requires weekly or monthly pay-
ments for the services provided by a particular dwelling unit, while the
latter requires that the household pUrchase a dwelling unit, typically with
the aid of external financing, and subsequently make regular outlays for
expenses such as maintenance, repair, property taxes, utilities, and
insurance. In addition to these regular outlays, most households make
monthly payments for interest and the retirement of principal.
As we have pointed out in Chapter 6, the decision to own or to rent
is related to household investment and savings decisions; moreover,
existing tax laws systematically encourage home ownership for a large
proportion of households. Because of these important conceptual differ-
ences, and because homeowners' expense data are generally not availa-
ble, few studies of the demand for housing have combined owner and
renter households. For that matter, because of the importance of capital
gains and losses, a satisfactory measure of housing expense for home-
owners is difficult to define and probably still more difficult to estimate.
When possible, researchers usually obtain separate estimates of the
demand for housing services by owners and renters. This practice is
entirely ad hoc, since there is no persuasive integrated theory of housing
2Richard F. Muth, Cities and Housing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969);
Margaret Reid, Housing and Income (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).156 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
demand which deals simultaneously with the ownership-rental decision
and the demand for housing services by owners and renters. Although
we consider both questions in our analysis, we cannot claim to have
provided such an integrated view.
In a recent aiticle, Frank de Leeuw attempts to reconcile several
authors' estimates of the demand for housing services with each other,
and with recent estimates of his own, based on BLS data.3 From this
evidence, he concludes that the overall income elasticity of rental hous-
ing in the United States probably lies in the range 0.8 to 1.0, and that the
income elasticity for owner-occupied housing is somewhat higher than
that for rental housing.
All but one of the studies reviewed by de Leeuw—Tong Hun
Lee's—were estimated from aggregate data and considered only a lim-
ited number of determinants of the demand for housing services.4 By
contrast, the analyses of the demand for housing services presented in
this chapter are based on individual data and consider a far wider set of
explanatory variables.
EXPENDITURESBY ST. LOUIS HOUSEHOLDS
Inthis chapter we present several statistical models of the demand
for housing services by St. Louis owner-occupant and renter house-
holds. The first of these equations, referred to as the "full model,"
includes the same eighteen socioeconomic variables used in Chapters 5
and6 to explain ownership and purchase decisions. Monthly outlays by
renters are measured by gross monthly rents, and those by homeowners
are estimated at ofthe market value of their homes. Next we
describe "simple models" of housing expenditure, which include only
income and race as explanatory variables. These simple models provide
estimates of the effect of annual income on housing expenditures and
facilitate comparisons of our findings with those of earlier studies.
Both the full and simple models indicate that black households
consume considerably less housing than white households of similar
characteristics. Therefore, we estimate both the full and simple models
of housing expenditures for whites and blacks separately. The final
section of this chapter examines models using one of the estimates of
permanent income developed in Chapter 6.
3Frank de Leeuw, "The Demand for Housing: A Review of Cross Section Evi-
aence," Review of Economics and Statistics 53, no.1 (Feb. 1971):1—11.
4Tong Hun Lee, "Demand for Housing: A Cross Section Analysis," Review of
Economics and Statistics 45, no. 2 (May 1963): 190—96.Determinants of Housing Expenditures 157
THE FULL MODEL
Thefull model of the determinants of housing expenditure includes
the life-cycle variables which may influence household decisions regard-
ing how much of their income to devote to housing. The included
variables are identical to those used to explain ownership, moving, and
purchase decisions in Chapter 5, and the results provide a generally
consistent view of the interrelated decisions of whether to purchase or to
rent and how much to spend under each form of tenure.
The full model contains eighteen explanatory variables in the case
of owners and twenty-two in the case of renters. The renter equations
include more explanatory variables because of the need to correct
monthly rents for differing contract terms, i.e., the provision of heat,
water, electricity, and furnishings by the landlord or by the tenant. The
eighteen socioeconomic variables used in both owner and renter models
include race, family income, years of education of the head of house-
hold, several variables describing the labor-force attachment of house-
hold members, a series of dummy variables to identify the several types
of households without children, and several variables describing the
characteristics of households with children.
All of the housing expenditure models presented in this chapter are
single-equation estimates obtained by ordinary least-squares. Appendix
D, however, presents models estimated using generalized least-squares
with the sampling proportions as weights. For all models, alternative
estimates are presented for linear (additive), semilog (dependent variable
expressed as logarithm), and log-log specifications. In addition, the
logarithm of family size (number of persons) is used in all equations,
rather than the number of family members.
Estimates obtained from the additive, semilog, and log-log specifi-
cations of the full model of housing expenditures for owners and renters
are presented in Table 7-1. To make comparisons between the coeffi-
cients of the linear owner and renter models easier, each coefficient of
the owner model is divided by one hundred. This procedure relies on the
widely used rule of thumb that monthly housing outlays by owner-
occupants average about 1 percent of the market value of their units.
It is not necessary to adjust the coefficients of the semilog and log-
log models, since the coefficients of both have convenient interpreta-
tions that are independent of the levels of either the dependent or
independent variables. The coefficients of the semilog models measure
the percentage change in the dependent variable associated with a one-
unit change in an explanatory variable. Thus, if income is measured in
thousands of dollars in a model explaining monthly rental outlays, a




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1160 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
increases the household's rental expenditures by 10 percent. The coeffi-
cients of the log-log model are, of course, constant elasticities and
therefore measure the percentage change in the dependent variable
associated with a given percentage change in an independent variable.
Thus, a coefficient for income of .10 in a log-log model on monthly rental
outlays would mean that a 1 percent increase in income would lead to a
one-tenth of 1 percent increase in rental outlays.
The income elasticities implied by the estimated coefficients are
presented on the next to last line in Table 7-1. For the linear model, the
elasticity is computed by multiplying the estimated income coefficient by
the mean value of income and dividing by the mean housing expense.
Thus, for the linear form, the income elasticities computed from the
regression equation are larger for households who currently spend a
smaller proportion of their annual incomes on housing. For the semilog
model, in which the dependent variable is expressed in logarithms, the
mean elasticity corresponds to the estimated income coefficient multi-
plied by the mean income of the sampled households. This specification,
which implies that the income elasticity is larger for households with
higher annual incomes, may seem reasonable for a sample composed of
many low-income households. For the log-log model, the elasticity,
which is simply the estimated income coefficient, implies that the income
elasticity is constant across the sampled households.
From Table 7-1, it is apparent that the alternative specifications
explain a large proportion of the total variance in rent and housing value
and have coefficients with the expected signs and reasonable magni-
tudes. The linear model explains the largest proportion of sample
variance for both owners and renters, 44 percent of the variance in rents
and 46 percent of the variance in house values. Similarly, the semilog
model explains a higher proportion of total variance than the log-log
model for both renter and owner households.
All six equations have large numbers of statistically significant
variables. Race, income, and years of schooling of the head are signifi-
cantly different from zero at the 1 percent level in all of them. In the
linear model, the results indicate that renter households spend an addi-
tional $2.40 per month ($28.80 per year) for housing for each additional
one-thousand dollars of annual income, whereas owners spend more
than three times as much out of each additional thousand dollars of
annual income ($7.97 per month or $95.64 per year). The accuracy of
these estimates of monthly and yearly expenditures by owners depends,
of course, on the correctness of the value/rent conversion ratio of 1:100.
Evidence presented in Chapter 8 suggests that the appropriate gross rent
multiplier for St. Louis may be closer to 1:150. Even so, owner-occu-
pants spend a larger fraction of additional income on housing thanDeterminants of Housing Expenditures 161
renters at any capitalization ratio less than 1:300. A similar dominance
for owner-occupants exists for years of schooling of the head; an addi-
tional year of schooling increases the monthly outlay of renter house-
holds by $1.81, as contrasted with an increase of $4.82 by owner-
occupants.
The relative magnitudes of the income coefficients for owners and
renters are reversed in the semilog model, where a one-thousand-dollar
increase in income causes renters to increase their monthly outlays by
3.4 percent, whereas a comparable increase in income causes only a 3.0
percent increase in housing expenditures by owner-occupants. Even so,
the income elasticities are larger for owners than for renters in all three
specifications. For both tenure types, the linear model provides the
largest elasticities and the log-log model provides the smallest. Although
the range of estimated elasticities is large, varying between .13 and .42
for owners and .08 and .20 for renters, all elasticities are small in
comparison to earlier studies.
Interpretation of these results is facilitated by Figures 7-1 and 7-2,
which illustrate how monthly expenditures vary as a function of annual
income for the linear and semilog specifications, holding the remaining
variables constant at their means.
In all six equations, the level of housing expenditure of black
households is significantly lower than that of white households after the
effects of all other factors included in the equations (family income, the
age and education of the head of household, family size and composi-
tion, and the labor-force attachment of family members) are accounted
for. The linear models indicate that, on the average, black renters spend
ten dollars (or about 16 percent) per month less for housing than
comparable white renters, and that black owners spend thirty dollars
less per month (live in single-family units worth $3,000 less) than compa-
rable white owners. Even larger differences in the housing consumption
of white and black households are indicated by the semilog and log-log
models. The former model suggests that black renters spend 17 percent
less on housing than comparable white renters, and the latter implies that
black owners spend 25 percent less than white owners. Still larger
percentage impacts are suggested by the log-log model.
These findings, if correct, have great social significance. They also
bear on a number of controversial issues concerning the effects of
housing-market discrimination on market prices and consumer behavior.
Analyses presented in subsequent chapters suggest that ghetto housing
is more expensive than housing outside the ghetto, and that black
households are limited to the ghetto. This finding is consistent with the
results of many, if not most, empirical investigations and is accepted by
a broad spectrum of scholars.162 HOUSINGMARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
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FIGURE 7-1
Estimated Monthly Housing Expenditures for All Renters by Annual
Income, Based on Alternative Specifications of the Full Model
However,opinion on the matter is farfromunanimous. For exam-
ple,Richard Muth argues that earlier studies similar to ours were
methodologically flawed and, moreover, that the evidence of a ghetto
markup is inconsistent with other evidence on market behavior of white
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FIGURE 7-2
Estimated Monthly Housing Expenditures for All Owners by Annual
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spend more on housing at each level of income, and that this behavior is
inconsistent with price discrimination.
Consumer expenditure surveys and census data on average contract rents
generally show that Negroes make greater expenditures on housing at any
given income level. Such evidence is frequently taken to mean that housing
prices are higher to Negroes than to whites, but this evidence is faulty for
several reasons...ifhousing prices for Negroes were higher than for
whites, Negroes would tend to spend the same or less for housing on this
account, not more.5
Muth finds further support for his views in his extensive analysis of
1950 and 1960 census-tract data for the South Side of Chicago:
For both 1950 and 1960 the coefficients of NEGMAJ, the Negro area
variable, were statistically significant in the VALHOU (an estimate of the
average value of housing consumed in dollars per household per month) and
VALAND (a measure of the value of housing produced in dollars per
square mile of land per month) regressions, but they were only half as large
in the late 1960 as in the corresponding 1950 regressions ..ifNegroes did
pay higher prices for comparable housing than whites, one would expect a
positive coefficient in the housing expenditure regressions, because it
would appear that the price elasticity of housing demand is —1 or even
smaller.6
He relies heavily on this alleged inconsistency to support his view
that the "effects of residential segregation on the price of housing to
Negroes is minor."7
In Chapters 9 and 10 several comparisons of land use intensity and housing
consumption in Negro areas versus others were made. On the whole, I
failed to find the kinds of differences one would expect to exist if Negroes
paid greater prices per unit of housing because of limitations on the residen-
tial area availabl.e to them imposed by their residential segregation. In
Chapter 9, per household expenditures for housing were found to be
significantly greater in Negro areas both in 1950 and 1960. However, since it
would appear that the price elasticity of housing demand is —Ior even
larger numerically, higher housing prices would not result in greater
expenditures on housing by Negroes.8
Our finding that black owners and renters spend substantially less
on housing than otherwise comparable households contradicts Muth's
findings. If, as Muth suggests, housing demand is highly price elastic,
5Muth, Cities and Housing, p. 111.
6lbid.,p.239.
7lbid.,p. 302.
8lbid.,p. 284.Determinants of Housing Expenditures 165
lower housing expenditures by black households are consistent with
higher prices for black households. Our finding for St. Louis is consis-
tent with Muth's (and others') findings of price differentials between
black and white submarkets and is consistent with our own analysis of
the issue in Chapter 8. Specifically, Muth obtains a discrimination
markup on the order of 5 percent for tenant-occupied housing, and on
the order of 10 to 20 percent for owner-occupied dwellings, based on
Chicago census-tract data.9 However, he disregards these estimates for
a variety of reasons.
In the case of the larger markup for owner-occupied units, for
example, Muth observes: "Such a difference, of course, if it exists, is a
substantial one for those who must pay it...butit's of small practical
importance since most Negroes are renters Ourfinding in Chapter 6
that whereas only 18 percent of Chicago blacks were homeowners in
1960, 47 percent would have owned their homes if their access to
housing suitable for home ownership were not impaired is of considera-
ble relevance to Muth's contention.
The lower frequency of home ownership for black households than
for white ones and the large differences between the expenditures of
black and white owners, and between the expenditures of black and
white renters, are consistent with the view that housing-market discrimi-
nation limits the locations and types of housing available to black
households. Other evidence in support of this interpretation is presented
in Chapters 9 and 10.
The estimates summarized in Table 7-1 further indicate that the
value of housing services consumed by owner-occupants of single-family
units inereases slightly as the number of years employed at the current
jobincreases,but that this variable exhibits no statistically significant
relationship to the housing expenditures of renters. Indeed, if there is a
relationship, it appears to be negative. Renters and homeowners are
very different groups in terms of job stability. The sample of owners
averaged nearly 12 years of employment at their current jobs, whereas
renters averaged only about 5.4 years. It should be recalled, moreover,
that years employed at current job is a highly significant determinant of
the probability of home ownership. The difference of approximately
seven years in the average job tenure of owners and renters is associated
with a 6.3 percent increase in the probability of home ownership (Table
5-1). Employment stability also strongly affects housing expenditures by
owners; an owner-occupant employed at the same job for an additional
twelve years, one standard deviation, will, according to the linear model,
9lbid., pp.299—300.
'°Ibid.,p.300.166 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
spend $6.72 more per month for housing than an otherwise identical
homeowner who has just accepted a new job. Using the semilog specifi-
cation of the owner model, a comparable difference in years employed
results in expenditures which are 4.8 percent higher.
The retirement dummy has an even larger effect on the expendi-
tures of owner-occupants. The linear model implies that retired owners
spend $25.51 more per month on housing than otherwise comparable
owners who are still in the labor force. The magnitudes of the semilog
and log-log models, expenditures 13 percent and 15 percent higher than
comparable households with employed heads, are also large. No statisti-
cally significant relationship is obtained between the retirement dummy
and rental expenditures; the relationship is negative, if anything. This
result suggests that the high expenditures by retired owners are due to a
delayed adjustment of their housing consumption, to an understatement
of annual income, or to both. Alternatively, these findings may indicate
that many retired homeowners are consuming capital previously
invested in real property, i.e., they are foregoing maintenance, and their
currenthousingoutlays are overstated by the market values of their
properties.
Most coefficients of the household-type dummy variables have the
signs anticipated and are reasonable in magnitude, but only a few are
larger than their standard errors. Collectively, these household types
account for over 40 percent of owner households and over half of
renters, but most of the individual categories are quite small. Only five of
the twelve categories (six household types times two tenure types)
account for more than 10 percent of their respective tenure groups. The
dummy variables for single males living alone most often pass the
conventional tests of statistical significance. These households spend
considerably less than households with children, single females, or
couples (Table 7-1).
Several of the variables which describe families, such as age,
number of persons, and number of children, although significantly differ-
ent from zero in the ownership and purchase models, have only small
effects on the level of housing expenditures by renters and owner-
occupants. If these household characteristics influence housing expendi-
tures, they do so primarily by affecting tenure decisions. if increases in
family size affect housing expenditures within tenure groups, the esti-
mates suggest that they reduce expenditures for renter households and
increase them for owner-occupants (Table 7-1).
The dummy variables designating families headed by females over
and under forty-five are statistically significant in a number of the
models. They indicate that young female-headed families living in rental
units spend more than male-headed families living in rental units, butDeterminants of Housing Expenditures 167
that older female-headed families living in rental units spend less. By
comparison, both young and old female-headed owner-occupant families
spend more than otherwise comparable male-headed families; this ten-
dency is most pronounced for older female-headed families. Both types
of female owner-occupant households are probably more affluent than
their annual incomes indicate. The much higher expenditures of older
female owners suggest that many occupy units purchased from insur-
ance policies, obtained in property settlements, or acquired during more
prosperous times.
Taken together, the results presented in Table 7-1 provide a highly
consistent description of the housing-expenditure patterns of renter and
owner-occupant households. The importance of variables stressed in
earlier studies—for example, income—is evident in these results. In
addition, however, the estimates provide considerable insight into how
additional socioeconomic characteristics influence the allocation of
income between housing and other goods.
THESIMPLE MODEL
Thefull models of housing expenditures presented in Table 7-I are
far more elaborate than those included in most earlier economic studies
of the demand for housing. In part, this is because the microdata used to
estimate them are not so severely hampered by the multicollinearity and
similar statistical problems that plague investigations relying on aggre-
gate data.
The danger of the approach represented by the full model is that its
detail and complexity may obscure fundamental underlying relation-
ships. For example, many of the variables included in the sample, such
as age and years on current job, are correlated with income. These
correlations are lower than those that would exist among the same
attributes if aggregate data for census tracts, cities, or metropolitan areas
were used, but nonetheless they are present. Including these correlates
of income in the model may reduce the magnitude of the estimated
income elasticities. Such a reduction is proper if the correlated variables
do, in fact, measure different influences. It is possible, however, that all
or part of the measured influences of these and other variables can be
attributed to their correlations with income; that is, the large education
coefficient may merely reflect the higher current and lifetime incomes
associated with more education. Where these conditions hold, a model
which includes only income may provide a more "correct" estimate of
the true influence of income on housing than one which includes both
income and education. For this reason, we have estimated a number of168 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
simple expenditure models which include only income, race, and, in the
case of the rental models, the contract-rent corrections. This procedure
also permits more meaningful comparisons of our results with earlier
studies that include only income as an explanatory variable. These
simple expenditure models are summarized in Table 7-2.
The simple models explain between two-thirds and eight-tenths as
much of the variance in the dependent variables as do the full models.
For example, the linear specification of the full owners model, which
contains eighteen explanatory variables, explains 46 percent of the
variance in the value of owner-occupied dwelling units, while the simple
model, which includes only two variables—income and race—explains
40 percent of this variance. To make these comparisons easier, the R2s
from the full models are reproduced toward the bottom of Table 7-2.
The coefficients of the race variable jire roughly the same in the
simple models as in the full models. The income coefficients, however,
exhibit larger and fairly consistent differences. In the simple renter
models, the income coefficients are larger than those obtained in the full
model for all three specifications. The linear specification of the simple
TABLE7-2
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model implies that renters increase their housing expenditures by $2.85
per month for each thousand-dollar increase in income, as contrasted
with $2.40 per month for the full model. The simple semilog model
indicates that rental households increase their monthly outlays by 4.5
percent with each thousand-dollar increase in annual income, whereas
the comparable increase for the full model is only 3.4 percent. Finally,
for renters, the constant elasticity of income for the log-log model is .14
using the simple formulation and only .08 using the full model.
The effect on the income coefficient of omitting variables is less
clear-cut in the case of owner-occupants. In two specifications—the
semilog and the log-log—larger income coefficients are obtained for the
simple model than for the full model. For the linear specification of the
owner model, however, the income coefficient is slightly larger in the full
model than in the simple model: $7.97 per thousand versus $7.48 per
thousand. The income elasticities of demand implied by the alternative
specifications are larger in the simple models than in the full models in
five of the six equations. The range of elasticity estimates is somewhat
reduced. The largest elasticities are implied by the linear specifications,
although all the elasticities are smaller than those reported by investiga-
tors making estimates from aggregate data.
Of the studies considered by de Leeuw in his review of the cross-
section evidence on income elasticities, only Tong Hun Lee's is based
on microdata.1' Lee obtained cross-section estimates of permanent-
income elasticities from the 1960—1961—1962 reinterview Surveys of
Consumer Finances. The availability of three years' income permitted
him to make rather powerful tests of the permanent-income hypothesis.
For both owner-occupants and renters, he estimated both a number of
equations similar to our full model, i.e., including several socio-
economic variables; and a number of equations, similar to our simple
model, including only income. Each alternative model was estimated by
ordinary least-squares, by an instrumental-variable technique attributed
to Livitan, and by an extension of Livitan's technique. Lee determined
that both instrumental-variable techniques provided larger estimates of
the income elasticities than ordinary least-squares for both owners and
renters, and that the estimates obtained from equations without demo-
graphic variables were larger than those obtained from equations includ-
ing demographic variables. Lee argued that the second instrumental-
variable technique provides upper-bound estimates of the permanent-
income elasticity.
For owners, Lee's estimates of the income elasticities—using 1961
11Tong Hun Lee, "Housing and Permanent Income: Tests Based on a Three Year
Reinterview Survey," Review of Economics and Statistics 50, no. 4 (Nov. 1968): 480—90.170 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
values as the dependent varables—vary from .371, employing OLS, to
.846 for his second instrumental-variable technique. When he adds
socioeconomic variables, the corresponding elasticities become .338 and
.892.Similarly, the estimated income elasticities for renters vary
between .503 with OLS and .663 for the second instrumental-variable
technique, when no demographic variables are included. Comparable
equations including demographic variables vary between .293, using
OLS, and .580, using the instrumental-variable techniques.
Lee's estimates are based on data obtained in a reinterview survey
in which no effort was made to follow movers. Since households with a
high income elasticity may have a greater probability of moving than
households with a low income elasticity, de Leeuw suggests that the
omission of frequent movers may have biased the estimated income
elasticity. He therefore proposes a correction for this bias that i.ncreases
the estimated income elasticity fo.r renters from .65 to .85, a value which,
de Leeuw reports, is similar to those obtained in other studies. How-
ever, he fails to find a plausible justification for increasing the size of
Lee's estimate of the income elasticity for owner-occupants, merely
remarking that "for owners, Lee's estimate is much lower than the
others reviewed."2
•Because of the different sampling rates employed in collecting our
data, the samples used in estimating the elasticities in Table 7-2 are not
representative of St. Louis households. Even so, it is useful to compare
them with the estimates surveyed by de Leeuw. They are markedly
lower than any of Lee's estimates, even his OLS estimates. We cannot
fully explain the reasons for the discrepancy; however, the heavy over-
sampling of central-city and, particularly, low-income populations pro-
vides part of the explanation. Evidence on this question is presented in
Appendix D, where estimates are shown for the simple expenditure
models estimated by generalized least-squares using population weights.
At the same time, our results, with lower income elasticities derived
from individual household data, are qualitatively consistent with the
lower income elasticities reported by Lee; by Maisel, Burnham, and
Austin; by Straszheim; and by Quigley. All of these studies, based upon
individual household data, report lower income elasticities than those
using grouped data.
Straszheim's results for a sample of white owner-occupants in San
Francisco were obtained separately for each of seven life-cycle cate-
gories, using individual households as units of observation. Income
elasticities ranged from a low of .219 for families headed by a single adult
with children to a high of .493 for married couples with two or more
12deLeeuw, "Demand for Housing: A Review,"p.6.Determinants of Housing Expenditures 171
children. These estimates, lower than those surveyed by de Leeuw, are
larger than our unweighted estimates in Table 7-2 and our weighted
estimates in Appendix D.
Maisel, Burnham, and Austin used housing-expense and owner-
income data for 2,900 new home purchases, one hundred observations
in each of twenty-nine SMSA's, to estimate price and income elastici-
ties. Results are presented for several models, using individual house-
holds as units of observation, using SMSA mean values as observations,
and using SMSA medians. For the equation containing price, income,
and household size, the income elasticity was .45 using individual
households, .71 using SMSA means, and .72 using SMSA medians. The
corresponding price elasticities were —.89using individual households,
—1.03 using SMSA means, and —.91using SMSA medians.
It is not obvious why the elasticities computed from individual
households as units of observation should be lower than those computed
from grouped data; or why our particular results, presented in this
chapter (and supplemented by weighted estimates in Appendix D),
should be low. There are several possible explanations, but none com-
pletely reconciles the differences.
The first, stressed by Reid and others, argues that "errors of
measurement" are more pronounced in microeconomic studies, includ-
ing our own. To the extent that a measurement of income based upon a
single household for a single year, or for a few years, contains a
significantly larger random error than an estimate based upon grouped
data, income-elasticity estimates computed from individual households
may be biased downward.
A second explanation emphasizes the "specification error" inher-
ent in estimates derived from grouped data. The process of aggregation
in grouping households reduces the information content of the data and
generally increases the correlations among important socioeconomic
determinants of housing expense—determinants which are then ignored
in aggregate estimation.
Closely related to this explanation is the possibility of significant
"interaction effects" between income, however measured, and other
determinants of housing expenditures. To the extent that these interac-
tions are not adequately represented in the statistical model, the results
may indicate a stronger downward bias in micro studies than in those
using grouped data. However, this hardly seems to be the case, at least
when dealing with the simple models presented in this chapter.
The exact nature of the "specification bias" or "interaction bias"
depends, of course, upon the correlations between variables omitted and
those included in the data. It is definitely not clear that aggregation
reduces these problems, and we suspect that the collinearity introduced172 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
by averaging individual data makes the problem of omitted variables
more volatile in the analysis of grouped data.
A final explanation for the discrepancy between studies based upon
aggregate data and those based upon individual households hypothesizes
a "peer-group effect" upon housing expenditures. This explanation
(suggested by de Leeuw in private correspondence) maintains that the
quantity of housing services demanded by a household may depend
upon its own income and the income or housing services of its peer
group. if this were true, and the peer-group or "relative-income" effect
were sufficiently strong (and positive), the income elasticities computed
from grouped data would be larger than those computed from individual
households.
The analysis of Maisel, Burnham, and Austin, using identical data at
different levels of aggregation, stresses loss of efficiency and general
"aggregation bias" as primary reasons why disaggregated analysis pro-
vides better estimates of income elasticities. Our explanation for rela-
tively low income elasticities in this analysis must also recognize mea-
surement errors in income (as well as in the weighting of observations
discussed in Appendix D). We explore this further at the end of the
chapter by presenting some results using crude estimates of "permanent
income," but we cannot claim that the measurement error in permanent
income, as we define it, is negligible.
HOUSINGEXPENDITURES BY BLACK AND WHITE
HOUSEHOLDS
Boththe simple and the full models of housing expenditures indicate
that black owners and renters spend considerably less than white house-
holds with similar incomes, family structure, and labor-force attach-
ment. The difference is particularly large for owners. However, the
models summarized in Tables 7-1 and 7-2 require that each explanatory
variable have the same effect on the housing expenditures of white and
black households. This unnecessarily restrictive condition may obscure
the manner in which market separation operates to modify black housing
demand. For example, if racial discrimination operates principally to
reduce black access to high-quality housing in high-quality neighbor-
hoods—housing attributes which are presumably more income elastic—
a lower income elasticity with respect to total housing expenditures
might be expected for black than for white households. Moreover, some
of the explanatory variables may have a different interpretation for the
two types of household. For example, there is considerable evidence
that, on the average, blacks with the same number of years of schoolingDeterminants of Housing Expenditures 173
as whites receive less education as measured by achievement tests.'3
Precisely how this fact should influence housing expenditure by whites
and blacks is uncertain, but it does increase the likelihood that additional
years of schooling would have a different effect on the housing expendi-
tures of black and white households.
For the above reasons, we present separate models for white and
black households. These models include the same explanatory variables
•that were used in the full and simple models of housing expenditure
obtained for the pooled sample of households. Moreover, each model is
estimated for the linear, semilog, and log-log specifications. We shall
reverse the order of presentation for these models, first discussing the
simple models of housing expenditure and then the full models. The
simple models of housing expenditures for white and black renters are
presented in Table 7-3 and those for white and black owners are pre-
sented in Table 7-4.
•From Table 7-3, it is apparent that while there are important differ-
ences between the simple black and white renter models, there are also
pronounced similarities. For all three functional forms, the constant
terms of the white equations are larger than those of the black equations.
No consistent pattern exists for the income coefficients, however. The
coefficient of income is larger for whites than for blacks in the additive
specification, smaller in the semilog specification, and approximately the
same in the log-log specification. These differences are somewhat easier
to evaluate in Figure 7-3, which illustrates how monthly outlays by black
and white renters vary with income for the linear and semilog models
presented in Table 7-3. Mean values of the contract-rent corrections for
black and white samples are used in Figure 7-3. The income elasticities
of demand indicate that the elasticity is substantially larger for whites
than for blacks in the linear models. The constant-elasticity model
indicates, however, that there is no substantial difference by race for
renters.
The coefficients of the contract-rent corrections are quite different
between the white and black equations in Table 7-3. Indeed, of the
twelve possible sign comparisons (four contract-rent correction varia-
bles times three specifications), the signs match in only three cases. In
two of the four cases where both coefficients are statistically significant,
the signs are the same.
A convenient way of evaluating the differences in the black and
white equations is to solve the white equations using mean values of the
black sample. If the equations for black households reflect the effects of
'3James S. Coleman et at., Equality of Educational Opportunity (Washington, D.C.:
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FIGURE 7-3
Estimated Monthly Housing Expense for White and Black Renters by
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TABLE7-4
Alternative Specifications of the Simple Models of Housing Expenditures for




Income 7741 3451 .0331 .0301 .2831 .032
Constant 105.10195.67'9.3819.1317.61'9.06'
R2 .37 .11 .29 .13 .20 .02
Number of observations329 72 329 72 329 72
Income elasticities .40 .19 .30 .20 .28 .03




4t ratiogreater than 1.0.
discriminatory limitations on black housing choices, solution of the
white equations using mean values for the black rental sample provides
estimates of what the housing expenditures of the sample of black
households would be if there were no limitations on black housing
choices. Mean rental outlay for the sample of black households is
$53.66;thevalues obtained from solving the white rental equation with
black means are $62.44 for the simple linear model, $58.01 for the
semilog model, and $61.69 for the log-log model.
Richard Muth suggests that the higher rents he obtained in predomi-
nantly black census tracts in Chicago can be explained by the more
frequent inclusion of utilities and furnishings in the rents paid by black
households. Our sample of St. Louis households indicates that the
proportion of units that are rented unfurnished and which require the
tenants to pay for their own heat is virtually the same for blacks and
whites. About 91 percent of both black and white renters choose unfur-
fished units, and about 73 percent pay for their own heat. There are,
however, fairly large differences in the proportions of black and white
households who paid their own water bills, or who supplied major
appliances such as a stove or refrigerator. However, these differences
are opposite to those which Muth anticipated. About 27 percent of black
households in this sample paid for their own water, as compared with
only 12 percent of white households. Similarly, 89 percent of black
renters had to provide their own major appliances, as contrasted with
only 77 percent of white renters.Determinants of Housing Expenditures 177
SIMPLE MODELS FOR OWNERS
Thehousing-expenditure behavior of black and white owners in St.
Louis is very different. First, the simple black-owner models explain a
far smaller proportion of the variance in the value of owner-occupied
single-family units than the comparable models for whites (Table 7-4).
(This contrasts with the results for the black and white rental models,
which are quite similar in explanatory power.) The difference is particu-
larly large for the log-log model, which explains only 2 percent of the
total variance in the monthly expenditures by black owner-occupants of
single-family homes. Because the log-log specification of the black-
owner model fits the data so poorly, discussion of the white- and black-
owner models will be limited to the linear and semilog models.
Both the linear and semilogarithmic models indicate that white
owners consume significantly more housing than black owners at every
level of annual income. The constant term of the linear model is nearly
ten dollars per month (one-thousand dollars in value) larger for white
owners than for black owners, and the difference in market value
increases as annual income increases.
The income coefficients of the linear models indicate that white
owner-occupants spend an additional $7.74 per month ($92.88 per year)
for each thousand-dollar increase in annual income, as contrasted with
black households who spend only an additional $3.45 per month ($41.40
per year) for each thousand-dollar increase in annual income. Using the
linear model, at fifteen-thousand dollars the difference in expected white
and black expenditures is $73.77 per month or $7,377 in value.
The relative difference in magnitude of the income coefficients in
the black and white equations is somewhat smaller for the semilog
models; whites increase their consumption of housing by an estimated
3.3 percent with each thousand-dollar increase in annual income,
whereas black owners increase theirs by 3.0 percent with each thousand-
dollar increase. The elasticities implied by the three specifications of the
model are very different for whites and blacks. For whites, the elastici-
ties are substantially higher for owners than for renters in all three
specifications. For blacks, the elasticities are substantially lower for
owners than for renters. Moreover, for each specification, the income
elasticity is far larger for whites than for blacks. These results are
consistent with the observation that moving to a better or larger owner-
occupied unit in response to income increases is more difficult fo.r
blacks, whose consumption of owner-occupied housing is geographically
restricted by discriminatory practices.
The mean value of owner-occupied single detached structures for178 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
our sample of black households is $11,781. If the linear white equation in
Table 7-4 is solved using the mean annual income of the sample of black
owners, an estimated house value of $15,477 is obtained. The logic
behind this is the same as that which applies to the simple rental models;
i.e.,it provides an estimate of the extent to which housing-market
discrimination causes black households to reduce their housing expendi-
tures. Such reductions may be the result of either simple price discrimi-
nation or more subtle limitations on the types of housing available to
black households. The estimates obtained from solving the semilog
equation, $14,675, and the log-log equation, $14,350, are smaller, but
they are still larger than the actual expenditure of $11,781 by black
homeowners. Figure 7-4, which graphs the expected black and white
house values at each level of income for the two specifications, illus-
trates these differences for black and white households at different
income levels.
THEFULL MODELS FOR BLACK AND WHITE
RENTERS
Additionof the sixteen demographic variables adds between 9 and
34 percentage points to the explanatory power of the twelve models. For
the renter models, the increase in explanatory power is quite uniform,
varying from a low of 9 percent to a high of 11 percent for the white and
black log-log models (Table 7-5). The range of improvement is much
wider for owner models, ranging from a low of 9 percent for the white
linear model to a high of 34 percent for the black log-log model (Table 7-
6). While the largest improvements are obtained for the three black
equations, an improvement of 18 percentage points is obtained for the
white log-log equation, whose coefficient of determination is .20 in the
simple model and .38 in the full model. The marked improvement in the
black-owner models should be assessed against the background of the
fairly modest size of the black-owner sample, i.e., only seventy-two
observations. The coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of
freedom, 70 in the simple model as contrasted_with 54 for the full model,
is actually slightly smaller for the full model (R2 =.12for the full model
and R2 =.18for the simple model).
The full renter models summarized in Table 7-5 exhibit many of the
same regularities evident in the simple renta.l models. The intercepts of
the white equations are larger than those in the black equations in both
the linear and semilog models. Moreover, the income coefficients are
positive and highly significant statistically in all six equations, and the
income coefficient for white renters is larger than that for black renters inDeterminants of Housing Expenditures 179
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FIGURE 7-4
Estimated Value of Single-Family, Owner-Occupied Units for Black and
White Owners by Income, Based on Alternative Specifications
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two of the three equations. The sole reversal is obtained in the semilog
equation: .036 for whites versus .044 for blacks. The income elasticities
are also higher for white than for black households for all six specifica-
tions.
The coefficients of the closely related education variable are statisti-
cally significant at the .01 level in all three white equations but are
significant—and then at the .05 level—in only one of the three black
equations. The coefficients of the years-of-education variable are much
larger in the white than in the black equations. Many previous studies
have reported that blacks earn less than whites from each additional year
of schooling, and these black-white differences are also evident in our
data, as shown in Figure 7-5. The smaller education coefficients in Table
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FIGURE 7-5
Mean Family Income by Years of Schooling of Head for White and Black
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TABLE7-5
Alternative Specifications of the Full Model of Housing Expenditures for
White and Black Renters
Linear - Sernilog Log-Log-
Variables WhiteBlackWhiteBlackWhiteBlack
Income 2.851 1.93'.0361.044'.090'.0692
Education 2.51' •942.034' .352'
Years on current job —.15 .06—.002 .001— .001.001
Retired 4.52 1.08.040—.018.030—.037
None employed —1.50—3.17 —.078—.048—.065
—•Ø944
More than one employed 5•573 .040.044 .1032
Families
Age —.000.002—.000.002
Number of persons —2.82 .33—.000.017—.004.023
Number of children _3.692 —.0512•Ø344 •Ø4Ø3.024
Female head < 45 years19.991 —.26.263'.000.2032 —.025
Female head > 45 years—6.98 .75.017.087—.001.004
Household types
Single female < 45 years—2.60 —.092 .145
Single female > 45 years—1.77 3.86 .068
Single male < 45 years — .64— .085—. .087
Single male > 45 years — —.2982— —.3402—
Couple, head <45 years _14.732 4.21_.2152.105_.2262..104
Couple, head > 45 years—4.90 3.50—. .019 —. .005
Corrections
No furniture _7•494 .1872
No heat _5•5Ø4 _.1382 —.302' _.1302 _.3201
No appliances —28.83' —.046'.2582 —.369'.2392
No water —2.12.062_•Ø794.042
Constant 49.71'45.8513.96'3.7012.90'3.271
R2 .45 .44.42 .37 .38 .33
Number of observations 328 266 328 266 328 266
Income elasticity .25 .15.23 .19 .09 .07





Also evident are some interesting differences between the rental
models for black and white households in the coefficients of the family
size and composition variables. The coefficients of the number-of-per-
sons and the number-of-children variables are negative in all three white
equations, suggesting that holding the effects of income, education, and182 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
similar variables constant, white renter households tend to reduce their
monthly outlays for housing as family size increases. This finding for
white renters, which is consistent with results obtained by David in his
analysis of the Survey of Consumer Expenditures data,14 does not hold
for blacks. In the three black equations, all family-size variables have
positive coefficients, though none are statistically significant. In inter-
preting these results, one should bear in mind that these variables
assume positive values only for families with children.
This difference in the observed behavior of black and white renters
is consistent with the hypothesized limitation on the supply of high-
quality units available to black households. White households with
additional members can substitute quantity (size) for quality expendi-
tures more readily, finding it easier to reduce housing expenditures by
economizing on quality. Black households, who are prevented from
consuming high-quality housing, are largely unable to make the tradeoff
required to shift resources away from housing consumption. Further
evidence for this proposition is discussed in Chapters 9 and 10.
This difference in the behavior of white and black renters is related
to our finding that racial discrimination in the St. Louis housing market
impairs black opportunities for home ownership. The probability-of-
ownership models in Chapter 5indicatethat families with children are
far more likely to be homeowners than are other household types. Of the
six types of households without children, only one—married couples
headed by an individual over forty-five—had a higher probability of
ownership than male-headed households with children, and this differ-
ence was not statistically significant (Table 5-1). Moreover, even old
couples had a statistically significant negative probability of purchase
(—.16),indicating a lag in their adjustment to changed housing demands.
For the remaining groups, the probability of ownership differed from
male-headed households with children by the following amounts: single
females under forty-five, —.31;single females over forty-five, —.15;
single males under forty-live, —.17; single males over forty-five, —.04;
and married couples under forty-five, —.31.
The positive relationship between the two family-size variables and
rental outlays in the equations for blacks then appears to result primarily
from restrictions on black ownership. White families, who desire more
space and whose employment and income circumstances permit them to
acquire it, tend to become homeowners, and all but the most impover-
ished or impermanent of white families seem to choose this life-style.
From the evidence presented earlier, home ownership is clearly associ-
14Martin David, Family Composition and Consumption (Amsterdam: North-Holland
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ated with larger housing expenditures. Thus, the shift from renting to
owning accounts for much of the increased expenditures for housing by
households with children.
From Table 7-5, it similarly appears that small families with children
spend considerably more on housing than households without children
of the same income and education levels and labor-force attachment.
From the linear model, for example, young couples headed by an
individual less than forty-five spend nearly $15 a month less for housing
than white male-headed families of three, with one school-age child. The
largest expenditures, at given income, education, and labor-force levels,
are made by young, white, female-headed households.
THEFULL MODELS FOR BLACK AND WHITE
OWNERS
Interms of the coefficients of the family-structure variables, the full
white- and black-owner models in Table 7-6 are more similar than are full
white and black rental models. For example, the signs of the coefficients
of the variables for family characteristics and household types are the
same in the black and white equations in twenty-four out of thirty-three
possible comparisons. The black and white income and education coeffi-
cients, however, are less similar than in the renter models. For example,
in the linear model, the coefficient of income is more than four times as
large in the white as in the black equation, and the coefficient of years of
education nearly six times as large. Similarly, in the semilog model, the
coefficient of income is three times as large in the white as in the black
model— .03 versus .01—and the coefficient of years of schooling is fully
six times as large— .042 versus .007. Moreover, the coefficients of the
retirement and the no-member-employed dummy variables are relatively
large in magnitude and opposite in sign in the black and white equations.
The income elasticities for whites calculated from the full model are
not much different from those presented for the simple model in Table 7-
4, but the elasticities calculated for blacks are implausibly low in all three
specifications.
MODELSWITH "PERMANENT" INCOME
Muchof the controversy surrounding the estimation of models of
housing expenditure centers on the proper measurement of income.
Specifically, Margaret Reid and Richard Muth have emphasized that the
proper measure of income to use in models of the demand for housing is184 HOUSINGMARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
TABLE7-6
Alternative Specifications of the Full Model of Housing Expenditures for





Income 8.20' .0301.010.2651 —.005
Education 6.2011.05.042'.007 .3781.100
Years on current job .0042 •ØØ42.0092
Retired 32.422 —8.46.1802 —.061.2741 —.060
None employed 169.302 —29.15 .8202 —.239.7152
More than one employed_17.102 —2.26—.025.010_•Ø494.039
Families
Age —.24—.21 —.001 —.001 .000 —.001
Number of persons 5.37 .005
Numberof children .10—2.64 .002—.025 —.028
Female head < 45 years22.1049•Ø54.074 .042 •3454
Female head > 45 years77.07k
Household types
Single female < 45 years21.09 .004 .026 .400k
Single female > 45 years .021 .147 .078.120
Singlemale<4syears 18.84 —12.08 —.122 —.136
Single male > 45 years .14.100 —.036 . —.028
Couple, head < 45 years 9.08 .022 •4774.004
Couple,head > 45 years .001 —.004
Constant 17.2875.51'8.88'8.98'6.3518.91'
R2 .46 .34.40 .36, .34 .36
Number of observations 330 72 330 72 330 72
Income elasticity .42 .09.28 .07 .26 —.00





the one that most closely approximates the concept of permanent
income.15
When microdata are used, as in this analysis, several authors have
suggested using the mean income of households with particular charac-
teristics to approximate permanent income, or at least to reduce the
transitory component.'6 Two such permanent-income variables were
'5Reid, HousingandIncome;Muth, Cities and Housing.
'°R. Ramanathan, "Measuring the Permanent Income of a Household: An Experi-
ment in Methodology," Journal of Political Economy 79, no. 1 (Jan. 1971): 177—85.Determinants of Housing Expenditures 185
constructed for use in Chapter 6 to evaluate whether the differences in
home ownership between white and black households might be
explained by black/white differences in permanent income. The first
used the mean annual income of race/education categories as a measure
of permanent income. The second used housing expenditures (rent and
value divided by one hundred) to proxy permanent income. The former
is used in this section to explain the housing expenditures of owner and
renter households.
The permanent-income models used to explain the housing expendi-
tures of owner and renter households are identical to the simple housing-
expenditure models presented previously, except for the addition of the
permanent-income variable. Linear, semilog, and log-log specifications
of these permanent-income models are summarized in Table 7-7 for all
owners and renters, and for black and white owners and renters. As is
evident from the last two columns in Table 7-7, adding a permanent-
income variable to the simple expenditure model produces a modest
increase in the overall explanatory power, i.e., an increase in R2. The
largest increases, 7 percentage points, are obtained for three of the log-
log specifications: the white renters sample, the pooled owner sample,
and the sample of white owners. The permanent-income variable is
statistically significant at the .01 level in all but five of eighteen equa-
tions.
Use of the permanent-income variable in the pooled rental equa-
tions substantially reduces the magnitude and statistical significance of
the dummy variable for race. These differences are summarized in Table
7-8 for both the renter and owner models. For example, adding perma-
nent income to the simple model of housing expenditures reduces the
apparent difference between the level of monthly expenditures by other-
wise comparable white and black renters from $9.52 per month to $3.29
per month. Similarly, adding permanent income about halves the coeffi-
cient of the pooled semilog rental model, decreasing it in absolute value
from —.156 to —.070.
Addition of the permanent-income variable has a similar, but less
pronounced, effect on the race coefficients of the pooled owner equa-
tions. For example, the race coefficient in the simple linear owners
model is —$37.64 ($3,764 in value); when permanent income is added,
the coefficient declines by about two dollars to —$35.72 per month
($3,572 in value). Similarly, when permanent income is added to the
semilog specification of the pooled owner model, the coefficient of
annual income declines from —.270to —.256.
From the permanent-income models in Table 7-7, it is apparent that
the intercepts of the white equations are consistently larger than those
obtained for the black equations, except in the generally less satisfactory
log-log equations and in the linear owner equations.186 HOUSINGMARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
TABLE7-7








All renters5 52.75'2.351 2.69'—3.29.41 .38
White renters55.2812.41' 2.81' .39 .35
Black renters47.42'2.34' 1.712 .36 .35
All owners 98.02'7.111 1.632—35.72'.41 .40
White owners71.09'6.40' 5.88' 39 37
Black owners94.14'3.381 .33 .12 .11
Semilog
All renters 3.901 .0381 .037' — .070.35 .33
White renters3.96' .032' .038 .36 .33
Black renters3.72' .0501 .032 .28 .28
All owners 9.321 .030' .012' — .257'.36 .35
White owners9.16' .024' .038' .33 .29
Black owners9.11' .030' .003 .13 .13
Log-log
All renters .106' .322'—.056.31 .28
White renters—.195 .097' .427' .34 .27
Black renters 1.612 .115' .1882 .23 .22
All owners 5.38' .101' .382'—.166'.29 .22
White owners .139' .462' .27 .20
Black owners7.87' .019 .06 .02






5A11 renter models include variables correcting for contract-rent differences which
are not presented in this table.
Moreover, the coefficients of the permanent-income variable are
larger in the white equations than in the black equations. In Table 7-9,
we once again summarize these differences by solving the white equa-
tions using means for black households. Including permanent income in
the rental equations substantially reduces the discrepancy between
actual black expenditures and estimated black expenditures, assuming
that the white behavioral equations apply. In fact, the semilog and log-
log equations with permanent income for whites yield estimates of blackDeterminants of Housing Expenditures 187
TABLE 7-8
Effect on the Race Coefficient of Adding Permanent Income to Models of




Without permanent income —9.52 —4.88 —37.64 —4.40
With permanent income —3.29 —1.49 —35.72 —4.17
Semilog
5.99 Without permanent income — .156 —4.69 — .270
With permanent income —.070 —1.85 —.257 —5.70
Log-log
Without permanent income — .187 —5.46 — .292 —5.89
With permanent income —.056 —1.37 —.166 —3.23
TABLE 7-9
"Expected" Black House Values and Rents Obtained by Solving White




Full model $53.66 $68.27 $11,781 $14,890
Simple model without
permanent income 62.44 15,477
Simple model with permanent
income 55.96 14,784
Semilog
Full model 58.00 • 14,650
Simple model without
permanent income 58.01 14,675
Simple model with permanent
income 53.31 14,625
Log-log
Full model 69.80 15,680
Simple model without
permanent income 61.69 14,350
Simple model with permanent
income 52.05 14,698188 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
rental outlays which are slightly smaller than the actual ones. In the
owner equations, as well, simple models reduce the difference between
actual and estimated expenditures. However, in all cases, the estimated
value of black owner-occupied units, based on white equations, exceeds
the actual value by at least $2,500.
SUMMARY
Inthis chapter we have presented several analyses of the determi-
nants of housing expenditures. Besides the functional forms employed,
the models differ in terms of the set of explanatory variables. The "full
models" of housing expenditure include as explanatory variables a
complex description of the household's income, family size and compo-
sition, and labor-force attachment. The "simple models" include only
income and race as explanatory variables. We also present some results
based upon crude measures of the permanent income of the sample
households.
In general, the results indicate that in addition to income, the
education, labor-force attachment, age, and life-cycle characteristics of
households are important determinants of their housing expenditures.
The estimates of the income elasticity of demand are larger for owner-
occupants than for renters for either the full models or the simple
models. The computed elasticities are smaller numerically than those
obtained by others using aggregate data, but are not much smaller than
those obtained in the few analyses based on microdata.
The analyses presented in this chapter clearly indicate that black
households in St. Louis devote fewer resources to housing consumption
than similar white households. The racial difference in housing con-
sumption constitutes important evidence regarding the effect of discrimi-
natory pricing upon black households. If housing consumption is price
elastic, as other researchers have argued, the lower levels of housing
consumption by black owners and renters may result from higher hous-
ing prices in the ghetto than in the white submarket. When separate
analyses are conducted for black and white households, a larger income
elasticity of demand is obtained for white owners than for white renters.
Among black households, the estimated income elasticity is higher for
renters than for owners. Finally, we find that the income elasticities vary
more between whites and blacks in the owner-occupied housing market.
These findings reflect limitations on the supply of owner-occupied
housing in the ghetto which prevent black households from buying as
much housing as their incomes and other household characteristics
would dictate, or from trading up in response to increases in income.Determinants of Housing Expenditures 189
Since rental housing is more plentiful in the ghetto, these restrictions are
less pronounced in the rental market. However, income elasticities for
blacks are generally lower than those for comparable whites, regardless
of model, functional form, or tenure.
Crude attempts to extend the analysis by including a proxy for
permanent income dO not change the substantive conclusions. Holding
permanent income constant in the estimated models, black households
still devote fewer resources to housing than comparable whites, and the
income elasticities are larger for white than for black households.